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I. INTRODUCTION
Jury voir dire,' the process of questioning prospective jurors in order to
determine whether they can be fair and impartial judges of the facts,2 is critical to
Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law; Assistant United States
Attorney, United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Iowa; LL.M., The University
of Missouri, 1997; J.D., The University of Iowa College of Law, 1988; B.B.A., The University of
Iowa, 1985. This Article was written by the author acting in his private capacity and not as an
employee of the United States government. All statements made herein reflect only the author's
own views and opinions, and not those of the United States government or the United States
Department of Justice.
1. The term "voir dire" derives from the French infinitive verbs for "to see" (voir) and "to
speak" (dire), and in that sense accurately and poetically describes the process of seeing and
questioning jurors during the jury selection process. Apparently, in Old French the words used
together meant "to speak the truth." DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 101-02
35
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a judicial system that relies on juries to resolve disputes.3 Jury voir dire is the
basis upon which courts decide whether to remove prospective jurors for cause4
and whether attorneys should use peremptories5 to remove prospective jurors.6
Jury voir dire is most important in criminal cases where a defendant's liberty, or
life, will be determined by a group of citizens randomly pulled from the
community.
Yet in federal criminal trials,8 the parties are not guaranteed by law that
anyone will question the prospective jurors about anything.9 Federal Rule of
(1963) (citing voir dire BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (4th ed. 1951); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 332; 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 480 (1839); 2 JOHN BURKE, JOWITT'S
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1869 (2d ed.1977); THE LAW-FRENCH DICTIONARY 143 (2004); 19
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 738 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989)) (stating that
"voir dire" derives from Old French and means "to speak the truth," and commenting that
"confusion results if the term is judged by the standards of modern French"). See also Hans Zeisel
& Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 491 n.1 (1978) (stating that the
accurate translation of "voir dire" is "true talk" because the French word "voir" derives from the
Latin word "versus," which means "truth"). Thus, in America voir dire has the legal definition of
"to speak the truth." Voir Dire, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999). Although our
hope may be that jurors speak the truth during voir dire, the literal translation of the French verbs of
"to see and to speak" strikes this author as more accurately describing the jury selection process.
2. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (explaining that jury voir dire enables
courts to select impartial juries and assists counsel in exercising peremptory strikes).
3. "Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial
judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially follow the
court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled." Rosales-Lopez v. United States,
451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion).
4. A court may remove a prospective juror for cause if the trial judge believes the
prospective juror cannot be fair and impartial. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (2012) (trial court may
dismiss a prospective juror who is "unable to render impartial service"). Either party may challenge
a juror for cause, asking the court to remove the juror, or the court may do so sua sponte. See 2
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 376, 382-84
(4th ed. 2009) (citations omitted). There are no limits to the number of "for cause" challenges a
party may make. See JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART,
AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 8.02 n.30 (2d ed. 1990) ("The number of challenges for
cause is unlimited.").
5. Peremptories, or peremptory strikes, are a means by which attorneys can remove
prospective jurors for any reason, or no reason at all, so long as the removal is not based on gender,
race, or national origin. See infra text accompanying notes 30-56 for a more thorough discussion of
peremptory strikes.
6. See Stephen R. DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson
and McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 890 (1995) ("Voir dire 'sets the stage' for both cause and
peremptory challenges by helping the judge and the parties identify biased potential jurors.").
7. Although this Article focuses on the importance of attorney voir dire of prospective
jurors in criminal cases, much of the analysis and reasoning would equally apply to jury voir dire in
civil cases.
8. Just as this Article focuses on criminal trials, its focus is also primarily on federal
criminal trials. This is for two reasons. First, federal cases and practices guide and inform state
court decisions regarding jury selection in criminal cases. See, e.g., Drain v. Woods, 595 F. App'x
36 [VOL. 67: 35
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Criminal Procedure 24(a) provides only that a court "may examine prospective
jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do so,"'0 but does not require
jury voir dire by a judge or attorneys. So, in theory, a jury could be empaneled
in a federal criminal case having not been subject to questioning by anyone.
Without questioning prospective jurors, a trial judge would be compelled to
determine whether to remove prospective jurors for cause in a vacuum, and the
lawyers would be left with little but the appearance, demeanor, and stereotypes
of the jurors upon which to exercise peremptory strikes."
In practice, though, federal judges usually conduct some voir dire, but often
exercise their authority, pursuant to Rule 24(a), to bar lawyers from directly
questioning prospective jurors in federal criminal cases.12 The justification for
barring the attorneys from directly participating in the selection of their own jury
is based primarily on a concern that it takes too much time, as well as a belief
that judges do a better job at voir dire. 13 Studies and surveys, including those
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, show these justifications are without
support.14
The question, then, is whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a)
ought to be amended to explicitly permit parties to directly participate in the
selection of the jury that will decide their case. This Article posits that attorney
participation in voir dire is essential to jury selection, particularly in federal
criminal trials. The first part of this Article briefly reviews the origin and
purpose of jury voir dire and peremptory strikes to set the stage for examining
whether attorney participation in jury voir dire advances these purposes.5 The
558, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2014) (addressing jury selection issues in state habeas corpus proceeding);
Libby v. Neven, 580 F. App'x 560, 563-64 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); Benjamin v. Meyer, 568 F.
App'x 603, 607-08 (10th Cir. 2014) (same). The second reason is more practical and parochial: the
author's experience in criminal cases is limited primarily to federal practice.
9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
10. Id.
11. Courts, commentators, and practitioners often use the terms "challenges" and "strikes"
interchangeably to refer to the removal of prospective jurors either for cause or peremptorily by the
parties. Discussion of jury selection would be more precise were the removal of prospective jurors
for cause termed "challenges" and the peremptory removal of prospective jurors termed "strikes," as
the former requires a judicial decision, while the latter does not. Lawyers may "challenge" a
prospective juror's qualifications or ability to serve, and therefore seek to have a prospective juror
removed for cause, in response to which challenge the trial judge must rule. In contrast, lawyers do
not "challenge" a prospective juror when exercising peremptories; rather, lawyers simply "strike"
the prospective juror. There is no challenge, response, or ruling. Accordingly, for-cause removal of
prospective jurors should be termed "challenges," and peremptory removal of prospective jurors
should be termed "strikes." This Article therefore adopts that practice, recognizing that courts and
other commentators use the terms interchangeably, and does not disturb their choice of terms when
quoted herein.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 126-140.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 187-189.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 191-194.
15. See infra Part II.
2015] 37
3
Williams: To Tell You the Truth, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(A) S
Published by Scholar Commons, 2015
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Article next examines the constitutional, statutory, and federal rules addressing
jury selection.16 The Article then reviews voir dire as it is actually practiced in
federal criminal trials, including an examination of the use of written jury
questionnaires as part of the voir dire process.'7 The penultimate portion of this
Article discusses problems and criticism with jury voir dire, both when judges
and attorneys conduct the voir dire.1 The final portion of the Article argues that
jury voir dire in federal criminal cases should involve written jury
questionnaires, voir dire by judges, and voir dire by attorneys, and proposes an
amendment to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(a) that would entitle
attorneys for the parties in a federal criminal case to conduct jury voir dire.19
II. JURY VOIR DIRE AND PEREMPTORY STRIKES
To determine whether attorney participation in jury voir dire is appropriate
in federal criminal cases, it is proper to consider the history and purpose behind
the practice. Moreover, the origin and purpose of peremptory strikes is relevant
to the extent that there is arguably a relationship between the need for attorney
participation in jury voir dire and the need for peremptory strikes. After
exploring these topics, the Article will turn to what the federal law says about
them.
A. The Origin and Purpose of Jury Voir Dire
Juries date back to as early as 500 B.C. in Greece, and evolved over the
20centuries to the form they take today in America. Juries used to consist of
people who had knowledge of the case and the litigants, but this changed over
time when the concept of an impartial jury of one's peers took root.21 Thus, by
the end of the fifteenth century, an English jury was intended to consist of
22impartial men. The requirement that jurors be impartial was incorporated into
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A Case for the Continued Viability of
the American Jury, 44 TEx. TECH L. REV. 303, 310 (2012) (citing Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory
Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 814 (1997))
[hereinafter Peremptory Challenges] (relating the history of the American jury).
21. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 390 (1996).
22. See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1407-08 (2001) (citing WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 125-
38 (James Appleton Morgan ed., 2d ed. 1875); Thomas A. Green, A Retrospective on the Criminal
Trial Jury, 1200-1800, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND 249-57 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988); Douglas Hay, The Class
Composition of the Palladium ofLiberty: Trial Jurors in the Eighteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD
38 [VOL. 67: 35
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23the American common law. Prior to the American Revolution, it was the
practice for the local sheriff to choose the jurors to sit on a case, with no
- - 24
questioning of the prospective jurors.
The purpose of jury voir dire is to seek information to inform a trial court's
decision whether to remove prospective jurors for cause, and to inform the
parties' decision whether to remove prospective jurors using peremptory
25strikes. There was little need for voir dire historically when juries consisted of
people with knowledge of the case. Thus, voir dire developed as an outgrowth
of the desire to seat impartial and unbiased citizens as jurors.26
As will be discussed in more detail below, the United States Constitution
27
incorporated the jury system in both criminal and civil trials. After adoption of
the Constitution, the early practice was for judges alone to conduct the voir
dire.28 Since then, the trend has consistently reflected that judges alone conduct
29voir dire in federal criminal cases.
B. The Origin and Purpose ofPeremptory Strikes
Peremptory strikes, that is, the ability of a party to strike prospective jurors
for any reason, originated from a desire to ensure an impartial jury.30 There is no
provision in the Constitution for peremptory strikes.31 The Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that peremptory strikes serve as an essential safeguard for
MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND 305 (J. S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green
eds., 1988); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 56 (2d ed.
1988); ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY §§ 43-44, at 34-36 (1922)).
23. See Lewis 0. Unglesby, "Speaking the Truth" About Attorney Voir Dire, 62 LA. B.J. 90,
91 (2014) (stating that in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall held that an
impartial jury was required by the common law).
24. Id.
25. Diprima, supra note 6, at 890 ("Voir dire 'sets the stage' for both cause and peremptory
challenges by helping the judge and the parties identify biased potential jurors.").
26. See Unglesby, supra note 23, at 91 (suggesting that voir dire "developed because society
became disconnected from the old English village traditions due to changes caused by the expansion
of the population" such that "a litigant had to secure some direct information about the jurors and
could not be expected to rely on general community knowledge.").
27. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
28. Unglesby, supra note 23, at 91.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 126-140.
30. See generally, Peremptory Challenges, supra note 20, at 812-27 (1997) (citations
omitted) (relating that peremptory strikes originated in England as a means for the government to
ensure that unbiased people served as jurors).
31. See U.S. CONST. amends VI, VII. See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-88
(1988) (noting that peremptory strikes are not constitutionally required, but, rather, were "a means
to achieve the end" of empaneling an impartial jury, so no constitutional violation occurred when
defendant had to use a peremptory strike to remove a juror who arguably should have been removed
for cause). Indeed, it appears that peremptory challenges were never even discussed in drafting the
Constitution or its amendments. See Peremptory Challenges, supra note 20, at 825.
2015] 39
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seating an impartial jury. 32 Historically, parties were free to exercise peremptory
strikes without having to give any explanation for striking a prospective juror,
and the decision could not be challenged.33
In the second half of the last century, however, the Supreme Court began to
restrict the previously unrestricted exercise of peremptory strikes, and opened to
examination the reasons attorneys claimed for striking particular jurors.34 This is
because the Supreme Court concluded that striking jurors based on their gender,
ethnic origin, or race could violate a criminal defendant's right to equal
protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.35 The
Supreme Court later recognized that the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
strikes could negatively affect prospective jurors' equal protection rights, not just
32. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (citations omitted) (noting that the essential nature of peremptory strikes is to permit
a party to strike a prospective juror "without a reason stated" and "without being subject to the
court's control" to further the party's effort to remove biased jurors) (citing Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892); State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Az. 1949)).
33. See Alan Rogers, An Anchor to the Windward: The Right of the Accused to an Impartial
Jury in Massachusetts Capital Cases, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 66 (1999).
34. See, e.g., Batson, U.S. 476, at 96-98 (citing Castaneda v. Partida 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, at 598(1935)) (overruling its earlier decision that the
defense must show that the prosecution systematically used peremptory strikes in a discriminatory
manner and holding that a defense attorney can question the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes
without the burden of showing systematic discrimination).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) ("Under the Equal
Protection Clause, a defendant may not exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror
solely on the basis of the juror's gender, ethnic origin, or race."); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (ethnic
origin (citing to Batson 476 U.S. at 96-98)); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 (race (citing Castaneda, 430
U.S. at 494)); Alexander, 405 U.S. at 632; Avery, 345 U.S. at 562; Norris, 294 U.S. at 598. The
Supreme Court has yet to apply Batson beyond race, ethnic origin, and gender. See United States v.
Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court has applied Batson only to
race and gender). Lower courts are divided on whether the Batson principle should apply to
religion. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(d), at 1092 (5th ed. 2009).
They are also divided on whether Batson should apply to other areas under constitutional protection,
such as sexual orientation or identity. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbot Labs., 740 F.3d
471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to a Batson challenge that was based on
sexual orientation). On November 12, 2012, the Attorney General of the United States adopted "as
a matter of Department policy, [Batson] should be interpreted to extend to juror strikes based on
sexual orientation." Memorandum to All Department Employees from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney
General, on Department Policy on Ensuring Equal Treatment for Same-Sex Married Couples (Feb.
10, 2014) (citing Memorandum to All Department Employees from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney
General, Guidance on Application of Batson v. Kentucky to Juror Strikes Based on Sexual
Orientation (Nov. 14, 2012)). Courts have not otherwise expanded the application of Batson. See,
e.g., United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to extend
Batson to prohibit peremptory strikes on the basis of obesity because obesity is not subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
40 [VOL. 67: 35
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36
the equal protection rights of criminal defendants. For that reason, the
prohibition against exercising peremptory strikes based on a person's gender,
ethnic origin, or race applies equally to the government and the criminal
37 3 8defendant. It also applies equally in civil cases, not just criminal cases.
Thus, a white defendant can object to the government using peremptory strikes
to remove minorities from the jury,39 an African-American defendant can
challenge the government's use of peremptory strikes to remove whites,40 and
the government can object to a defendant's similarly improper use of peremptory
strikes.4'
In exercising peremptory strikes, attorneys often rely in part on stereotypes,
assuming that certain types of people from particular areas or with similar
socioeconomic backgrounds share certain belief systems favorable or
unfavorable to one side or the other.42 For example, prosecutors may believe
wealthy, well educated, or politically conservative people are more likely to be
favorable to the government in a criminal case.4 3 In contrast, defense attorneys
may believe that actors, writers, and artists are better for criminal defendants.44
Studies have shown, however, that attorneys often draw inaccurate conclusions
45about prospective jurors relying on stereotypes. As inaccurate as reliance on
36. See United States v. Hemandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1171 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith,
J., concurring) (recognizing that Batson protects prospective jurors' rights (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 84)).
37. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-59 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (holding that a criminal defendant's exercise of racially-discriminatory
peremptory strikes violates the prospective juror's constitutional right to equal protection).
38. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) (applying Batson to
jury selection in a civil case).
39. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
40. See Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987).
41. See MeCollum, 505 U.S. at 59.
42. See, e.g., Rachael A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why It Fails to Detect Juror Bias, 23
CRIM. JUST. 22, 22 (2009) (stating that some attorneys "rely on stereotypes that relate certain
demographic characteristics such as gender, age, race, and occupation to a pro-prosecution or pro-
defense predisposition."); Frank P. Andreano, Voir Dire: New Research Challenges Old
Assumptions, 95 ILL. B.J. 474, 477 (2007) (asserting that recent studies suggest that "traditional
methods of juror profiling, such as age, race, sex or wealth, do not accurately predict juror attitudes
when compared to directing [sic] questioning.").
43. See Jeffrey T. Frederick, Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 OHIO
N. U. L. REV. 571, 574-75 (1978) (citing John P. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict
Trends, 65 Sw. Soc. SCI. Q. 361, 366 (1965)) (noting studies that show that "[j]urors of higher
economic status and higher educational levels were more likely to convict.").
44. See Caroline Crocker Otis et al., Hypothesis Testing in Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 38
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 392, 392 (2014) (citing Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths
and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 229, 230-31 (1990)) (relating common "lay theories" or "attorney folklore"
about prospective jurors).
45. Id. at 401 (citing Holley S. Hodgins & Miron Zuckerman, Beyond Selecting Information:
Biases in Spontaneous Questions and Resultant Conclusions, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
2015] 41
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stereotypes may be, attorneys may nevertheless still exercise their peremptory
strikes relying on them so long as the stereotype is not based on a
constitutionally protected area.
If one side believes that the other exercised a peremptory strike for an
unconstitutional reason, the party may make a so-called Batson challenge, which
requires the trial court to hold a Batson hearing.47 This three-part procedure,
48borrowed from a similar process used in employment discrimination cases,
begins with the objecting party making an initial prima facie showing that the
peremptory strike was unconstitutionally motivated.49  If the moving party is
able to make such a showing, the burden shifts to the party who exercised the
peremptory strike to articulate a neutral explanation for the challenges.50 The
standard here is not high. "Although the prosecutor must present a
comprehensible reason, '[t]he second step of this process does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible'; so long as the reason is not
inherently discriminatory, it suffices."
If the non-moving party articulates a non-discriminatory reason, the court
must then decide whether it was the real and legitimate reason, or was merely a
pretext for striking the juror for an unconstitutional reason.52 "This final step
involves evaluating 'the persuasiveness of the justification' proffered by the
prosecutor, but 'the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [the alleged
discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike."' 53  If the trial court finds the peremptory strike was motivated by a
constitutionally improper reason, the court may remedy the improper use of
peremptory challenges by discharging the entire venire (the group of citizens
from which the jury is selected) and selecting a new panel,54 or by disallowing
387, 403 (1993)) (summarizing the conclusion from one such study, showing it was consistent with
past studies finding that attorney generalizations about prospective jurors are often mistaken).
46. See Anthony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 261 (2005).
47. See State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-06, 454 S.E.2d 317, 319-20 (1995).
48. Barbara O'Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Beyond Batson's Scrutiny: A Preliminary Look
at Racial Disparities in Prosecutorial Peremptory Strikes Following the Passage of the North
Carolina Racial Justice Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2013) (citing Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18, 96 n.19 (1986)) (stating that the Batson procedure was borrowed from the
procedure used in employment discrimination cases).
49. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42
(1976)).
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972)).
51. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-
68 (1995) (per curiam)).
52. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767);
United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 (3rd Cir. 1993).
53. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).
54. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory
Uses ofPeremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (1994).
42 [VOL. 67: 35
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the improper challenge and seating the struck juror.5 5 If the Batson objection is
56
incorrectly dismissed but found on appeal, the remedy is a new trial.
All of this is important to the extent that a robust voir dire record provides
the basis upon which trial and appellate courts are able to evaluate whether a
peremptory strike has been used for proper or improper purposes. Therefore, as
we explore whether it is preferable to have the parties directly participate in voir
dire, it is appropriate to recognize there is a direct relationship between voir dire
and peremptory strikes.
C. The Relationship Between Voir Dire and Peremptory Strikes
Courts and commentators are often critical of peremptory strikes. Some
commentators argue peremptory strikes should be abolished, while others argue
that the number of peremptory strikes afforded each side should be limited.5 8 It
does not appear that peremptory strikes will be eliminated any time soon.59 The
Supreme Court has recognized the symbiotic relationship between adequate voir
60dire and the ability of attorneys intelligently to exercise peremptory strikes.
"The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as
a predicate for the exercise of peremptories . ...
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued there is, or perhaps ought to
62be, an inverse relationship between voir dire and peremptory strikes. In other
55. See Youngblood v. Brown, 465 F. Supp. 2d 270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
reseating two struck white prospective jurors was appropriate remedy when court found merit in the
prosecution's "reverse Batson claim," concluding the defendant's striking of white prospective
jurors was race-based and his purported neutral explanation pretextual); see also Cynthia Richers-
Rowland, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 1195, 1220-21 (1987) (citing Batson, 1476 U.S. at 99 n.24) (summarizing remedies for
successful Batson challenges).
56. See United States v. Kimbrel, 532 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that only a new
trial can remedy a Batson violation found on appeal because the error is deemed structural and not
subject to harmless error analysis).
57. See, e.g., Maisa Jean Frank, Note, Challenging Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to the
Jury Selection Process Using Minnesota as a Case Study, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2075, 2091 (2010)
(stating that lawyers have proposed changing the number of peremptory strikes afforded each
party).
58. See, e.g., Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 1432 (advocating for the abolition of
peremptory strikes); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, The Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 168-69 (2010) (advocating for the abolition of
peremptory strikes).
59. See Bennett, supra note 58, at 167 (recognizing "there has admittedly been little support
from courts or legislatures" to eliminate peremptory strikes).
60. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965).
61. Id. at 218-19.
62. See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES § 4:1, at 133 (7th ed.
2013) ("Peremptory challenges are necessary, it is argued, so long as voir dire is perfunctory.").
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words, the argument is that peremptory strikes are necessary because attorneys
lack sufficient information about prospective jurors to be able to challenge them
63for cause. If, however, attorneys are provided with the ability to conduct voir
64
dire, then the need for peremptory strikes is removed or at least diminished.
This reasoning has led some to argue that an increase in attorney participation in
voir dire decreases the need for voir dire.65
This argument assumes, however, that jury voir dire will successfully
uncover all jury biases and disqualifications, and further assumes that, once
uncovered, a party could then successfully challenge a prospective juror for
cause. These are faulty assumptions. First, even when attorneys are permitted
full participation in jury voir dire, it is no guarantee that it will uncover hidden
biases or other facts that would render a prospective juror subject to removal for
cause.66 Although voir dire certainly increases the likelihood of uncovering bias,
it is unrealistic to believe that it will always do so.
Second, it is a false assumption that information learned through jury voir
dire would justify removal of the prospective juror for cause. It may be that jury
voir dire reveals a bias or belief system that does not rise to the level that the
juror is subject to removal for cause. Prospective jurors often assert they can be
fair and impartial, despite their beliefs, and that is generally sufficient to defeat
67challenges for cause. That does not mean, however, that the prospective jurors
63. See id.
64. See Bennett, supra note 58, at 168 ("The more information a lawyer obtains from a
potential juror, the better informed the lawyer and the judge are on challenges for cause, but the
greater the likelihood that the lawyer would exercise a peremptory challenge based upon the
lawyer's own explicit and implicit bias."). This author disagrees with Judge Bennett's cynical
presumption; the more information a lawyer has about a prospective juror, there is a higher chance
that the lawyer will not have to rely upon stereotypes and preconceived biases, and the greater the
likelihood the lawyer will base peremptory strikes on facts about the prospective juror's actual
views and values. Judge Bennett admits "increased lawyer participation in voir dire should increase
the information about jurors' biases" on which strikes for cause can be based. Id. at 168. He does
not explain why increasing the information available to the lawyer about a prospective juror will
impact challenges for cause, but when it comes to the exercise of peremptory strikes, the lawyer will
fall back upon the lawyer's explicit or implicit biases.
65. See id. at 168 (arguing that lawyer participation in voir dire should be increased, but
peremptory strikes eliminated).
66. See ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 66 (1979) (recognizing that
prejudice and bias "may be buried deep within the subconscious" of prospective jurors).
67. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984) (if a prospective juror expresses
the belief he or she is able to set aside an opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence, a court
is not required to remove the juror for cause, no matter what the opinion); see also, e.g., United
States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 464-65 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding the district court did not err in
denying a motion to remove a prospective juror for cause, where the prospective juror's child had
been kidnapped, when the prospective juror made assurances during voir dire that she could remain
impartial (citing Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036; Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 626 (7th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000))); United States v.
Fulks, 454 F.3d 410, 433-34 (4th Cir. 2006) (in a criminal case involving charges of sexual assault,
finding the district court did not err in denying a motion to remove for cause a prospective juror
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will be fair and impartial. Peremptory strikes remain a method by which the
attorneys can remove such suspect prospective jurors and thereby inch closer to a
truly fair and impartial jury. 68
This point is best made by way of illustration. Imagine a case where a
defendant is charged with arson, and a prospective juror reveals during voir dire
that his mother died in an arson fire. Imagine further, though, that the
prospective juror swears he can be fair and impartial despite that personal
history. No self-respecting defense attorney would want that prospective juror to
sit in judgment of the arson defendant. It is reasonable to believe that, all things
being equal, someone without that prospective juror's personal experience is
more likely to be able to render a fair and impartial verdict. This same
prospective juror may be a fine juror in a different criminal case with different
charges, like a drug case, for example, or in a civil case. But, this prospective
juror is not likely to be the most fair and impartial juror in an arson case. If the
parties were deprived of peremptory strikes, it would be difficult to persuade a
judge to remove this prospective juror for cause when the prospective juror
swears he or she can be fair and impartial. As a result, without peremptory
strikes this highly suspect juror, who may not even fully appreciate his or her
own latent bias, could sit in judgment of the arson defendant.
Moreover, if parties are deprived of peremptory strikes, it increases the
chance that erroneous rulings on for-cause challenges will require new trials.
This is because if a trial court should have removed a prospective juror for cause,
but a defendant uses a peremptory strike to remove that prospective juror, there
is no reversible error unless the defendant can show that the resulting jury was
biased.69 Deprived of peremptory strikes, litigation over the granting or denial of
for-cause challenges would increase. As it is, peremptory strikes serve as an
insurance policy against erroneous rulings on challenges for cause.
Accordingly, the relationship between attorney participation in jury voir dire
and attorneys being able to exercise peremptory strikes is positive, not inverse.
whose sister had been the victim of a sexual assault because the prospective juror assured the court
she could be impartial).
68. Indeed, peremptory strikes are a means of insurance for removing prospective jurors who
prove reluctant to reveal bias and harbor ill will toward the attorney who tried to uncover it. See
Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1139, 1176 (1993) (citing Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L REV. 725, 721 (1992)) ("[A]bolition of the
peremptory would make it more difficult for the litigant to lay the groundwork for a cause
challenge, as the vigorous questioning may antagonize and hence prejudice a potential juror. The
peremptory challenge is the insurance that makes genuine inquiry into juror bias possible.").
69. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (holding that where a trial court
improperly failed to remove a prospective juror for cause, but the defendant removed that
prospective juror by exercising a peremptory strike, no error occurred unless the defendant can
show the empaneled jury was biased (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986))).
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Jury voir dire aids the parties in exercising peremptory strikes.70 The need for
peremptory strikes does not decrease as attorney participation in jury voir dire
increases.
III. FEDERAL LAW PERTAINING TO JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
Having explored the origins of jury voir dire, peremptory strikes, and the
relationship between the two, this Article will now turn to examine the federal
law as it pertains to jury selection generally, and jury voir dire specifically, in
federal criminal cases. An examination of this process reveals sparse treatment
and spare rules regarding jury voir dire, leaving it within the wide discretion of
federal judges to grant, deny, or restrict jury voir dire by attorneys representing
the United States or a criminal defendant.
A. Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution explicitly says little about criminal juries, and nothing
about the jury selection process.7  Although it commands juries in criminal
cases,72 there are no provisions in the Constitution regarding the composition or
size of a criminal jury. There are likewise no provisions for voir dire.73  As
discussed below, judicial decisions have put some meat on the bones of the
Constitutional skeleton of the right to a jury in a criminal case, but the process
largely remains irregular and unregulated.7 4
Whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury depends on the
charges and the degree of punishment to which the defendant could be
subjected. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . ... 76 The Supreme Court has
70. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (recognizing that jury voir dire aids
attorneys in exercising peremptory strikes).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3.
73. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
74. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.6 (1970) (deciding that a potential sentence
prison sentence in excess of six months is not a "petty" offense, worthy of a jury trial). But see
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (holding that a defendant has a right
to a jury trial "only if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in
conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly
reflect a legislative determination that the offense . . . is a 'serious' one.").
75. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Cheff
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624,
628-30 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621,
624 (1891)).
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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concluded, though, that the right to a jury does not apply to petty offenses."
That is so even if the defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses for
which, if punishment was aggregated, the sentence could result in the equivalent
of punishment for more serious offenses.
There is nothing in the Constitution establishing the size of a criminal jury.79
At common law at the time the Constitution was adopted, a typical jury consisted
of twelve people,so but this was not always the case.si Indeed, in Williams v.
Florida, the Supreme Court concluded that "the fact that the jury at common law
was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the
purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to
mystics."82
As mentioned previously, the purpose of jury selection in the United States
courts is to arrive at an impartial jury.83 This purpose is reflected in and now
founded upon the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
77. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159 (citing Cheff 384 U.S. at 379; Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624;
Schick, 195 U.S. at 68; Natal, 139 U.S. at 624).
78. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 330 (1996). What constitutes a petty offense is
more complicated than it would seem. Generally, any offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment of not more than six months is a petty offense. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6.
Nevertheless, if the statute imposes other penalties in addition to imprisonment, then the defendant
may be entitled to ajury trial. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (discussing issue).
79. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 141 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
80. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 177 (1973) (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 98-99 n.45 (1970); Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American
Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 412 (Ass'n Am. Law Schs.
eds. 1907)) (relating history of American colonies adopting English common law tradition of
providing for juries consisting of twelve people); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 98-99
n.45 (similarly reciting common law history of juries consisting of twelve people); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (holding that the words "trial by jury" contained in the Sixth
Amendment "means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all the
essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was
adopted .... Those elements were: (1) That the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more
nor less . .. .); Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 141 (in famous trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall held
that, although the Constitution is silent as to the size of a criminal jury, "whether of twelve, thirteen,
twenty-three, or any other number," it is taken to mean a jury of twelve men because that was is the
number at common law).
81. See generally Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 513, 513-29 (2012) (citations omitted) (relating the history of jury systems
throughout history, noting for example that the ancient Greeks empaneled juries of 500 citizens).
82. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). But see Spearlt, Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual:
Making Cultural Sense of Harsh Punishment, 82 MIss. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2013) (quoting FORSYTH,
supra note 22, at 45 n.2) (citing Robert H. Miller, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A
Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 620,
634-36 (1998)) (tracing the number of 12 jurors to Christian religious origin, mirroring the number
of Christ's Apostles).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
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speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."84
The word "impartial" pertains to both the selection of the citizens
constituting the venire as well as the selection of the jurors serving as the petite
jury. The Sixth Amendment fails, however, to define the meaning of an
impartial juror, leaving the term to judicial interpretation.86
The requirement of an impartial jury guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment
has been interpreted as requiring that jury panels be drawn from citizens
representing a "fair cross section" of the community in which the defendant is
being tried.7 This "fair cross section" requirement, however, applies only to the
larger jury venire and not to the composition of the ultimate petite jury deciding
an individual case.88 Thus, "the Sixth Amendment guarantees the opportunity
for a representative jury venire, not a representative venire itself."89 Courts are
granted, through the federal supervisory power, the authority to control the jury
selection process to achieve this goal, subject to limited statutory provisions.90
B. Statutory Provisions
Only one statute and two rules address federal criminal juries and jury
selection.91 By statute, the basic qualifications for people to serve as federal
jurors is that they must be citizens of the United States, over eighteen years of
age, and live in the district for a year.92 Yet, any such person who has pending
felony charges or convictions; cannot read, write or understand English; or
suffers from physical or mental disabilities that would make it impossible to
serve, is deemed unqualified to be a federal juror.93
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
85. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating
that juries must have a "broad representative character ... as assurance of a diffused impartiality."
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946))).
86. See Scott Brooks, Comment, Guilty by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense
Demands a Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1183, 1189
(2013) (citing United States v. Wood, 229 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury
2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1618-21 (2011)) (noting that, because the text of the Sixth
Amendment does not define "impartial," interpretations have been left to the courts and
commentators).
87. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 535-36.
88. See id. at 538 ("Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition."
(citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413
(1972))).
89. United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1244 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Roman v. Abrams,
822 F.2d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis original).
90. Mu'Minv. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991).
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23; FED. R. CRIM. P.24.
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2012).
93. See id.
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses the size and
composition of a jury in a federal criminal case.94  Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, if a defendant is entitled to a jury trial
because of the nature of the charges, the case must be decided by a jury unless
the defendant and the government both waive a jury trial, and the court
approves.95 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 23(a), and
rejected the argument that a defendant should be able to waive a jury regardless
96of whether the government consents. Furthermore, "Rule 23(a) does not
require that the Government articulate it reasons for demanding a jury trial at the
time it refuses to consent to a defendant's proffered waiver."97
Rule 23(b) provides for the size of a jury in a criminal case. Generally, a
federal criminal jury is to consist of twelve jurors.98 The rule makes provision
for a smaller jury, however, either by stipulation of the parties, or when a juror is
excused for good cause after the trial begins.99 Rule 23(c) sets out the findings a
trial judge must make when a case is tried without a jury.100
The only rule addressing the jury voir dire is Rule 24(a).101 Rule 24(a)(1)
provides that "[t]he court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the
attorneys for the parties to do so.',102 Rule 24(a)(2) states that, "[i]f the court
examines the jurors, it must permit the attorneys for the parties" to either "(A)
ask further questions that the court considers proper; or (B) submit further
questions that the court may ask if it considers them proper."'103 Rule 24 does
94. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
95. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
96. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-37 (1965).
97. Id. at 37.
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(1).
99. Rule 23(b) permits a jury of less than twelve jurors if, "[a]t any time before the verdict,
the parties may, with the court's approval, stipulate in writing that: (A) the jury may consist of
fewer than 12 persons; or (B) a jury of fewer than 12 persons may return a verdict if the court finds
it necessary to excuse a juror for good cause after the trial begins." The rule further provides that,
"[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a
verdict if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for good cause after the trial begins." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(b)(2).
100. When a case is tried to the court, Rule 23(c) requires the trial judge must find the
defendant guilty or not guilty, and if requested by one of the parties, must state its findings of fact in
writing or in open court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c).
Frankly, this Rule should be amended to recognize the possibility of a third verdict: not guilty
only by reason of insanity. See 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b) (2012) ("If the issue of insanity is raised by
notice as provided in Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on motion of the
defendant or of the attorney for the Government, or on the court's own motion, the jury shall be
instructed to find, or, in the event of a nonjury trial, the court shall find the defendant 1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or (3) not guilty only by reason of insanity.").
101. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1).
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(2).
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not define what constitutes a proper or improper question.104 It does not provide
any guidance for judges in determining whether to allow lawyers to participate in
voir dire, nor does it restrict the court's discretion in any way in making the
decision. 105
Rule 24(a) gives courts broad discretion over jury voir dire in federal
criminal trials.106 The rule expressly permits trial courts to deny attorneys direct
participation in jury voir dire, and the trial court need not give justification for
it. 107 Appellate courts will seldom reverse district courts when they deny
attorney's requests that the court ask specific questions.0 8 That is because in
ruling on matters during voir dire, trial judges often have to rely on their
perceptions and evaluations of demeanor and credibility.1 09  Consequently,
appellate courts grant trial courts broad discretion in controlling the questions
attorneys ask when they are allowed to directly examine prospective jurors."10
The Supreme Court has required voir dire questions be posed only when a
prospective juror's views regarding race,"' ethnicity,'1 2 or the death penalty' 13
104. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) ("[F]ederal judges
have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire."); Skilling v.
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (stating that trial judges have wide discretion over jury
selection and that it is "particularly within the province of the trial judge" (quoting Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 595 (1976))); United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding no
abuse of discretion when the court refused the defendant's list of proposed questions); United States
v. Harper, 527 F.3d 396, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no abuse of discretion where court refused
to ask jurors whether they could follow specific laws at issue).
107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1).
108. See GORDON BERMANT & JOHN SHAPARD, THE VoIR DIRE EXAMINATION, JUROR
CHALLENGES, AND ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 14 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed. 1978) ("Appellate courts have
been very reluctant to reverse trial judges' decisions not to allow a particular line of questioning that
was aimed at obtaining information for exercising peremptory challenges.").
109. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (noting that, "[d]espite its importance, the adequacy
of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review [because judges] must reach conclusions as to
impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of
responses to questions.").
110. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991) (affording trial judges wide discretion
in determining what questions are permissible during jury voir dire); Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at
190 (noting that the Constitution leaves it to the trial court to determine the need for particular
questions during voir dire); see also GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 4, § 11. 11 (noting that judges
use their discretion in controlling the questions attorneys ask injury voir dire).
111. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1976).
112. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192 (citing Ristaino, 424 U.S. 589; Aldridge v. United
States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931)).
113. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 731 (1992) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 523 (1968)).
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are at issue in a case, and has found voir dire may be necessary where pretrial
publicity may impact the ability to seat an impartial jury."14
Rule 24(b) addresses how many peremptory "challenges" or strikes each
side is allowed, which differs depending on the nature of the charges."t5  Rule
24(b) provides that a court may increase the number of peremptory strikes in the
limited circumstance that there are multiple defendants.116 If a court grants
additional peremptory strikes, the committee notes to the Rule provide that "the
prosecution may request additional challenges in a multi-defendant case, not to
exceed the total number available to the defendants jointly."" 7 The court is not,
however, required to provide additional peremptory strikes or equalize the
number of peremptory strikes."8 The rules are silent as to the procedure for how
the parties are to exercise peremptory strikes.' 19
Rule 24(c) deals with alternate jurorS.120 Courts routinely seat alternate
jurors as insurance against having to declare a mistrial should one or more jurors
become ill or otherwise unable to serve.121 These alternate jurors may be
substituted for regular jurors during the course of the trial in the event a regular
114. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (relying on the trial judge who
"sits in the locale" where the publicity takes place to determine whether voir dire is needed in light
of pretrial publicity (quoting Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424)).
115. Generally, in capital cases each side is permitted twenty peremptory strikes, in felony
cases the government is permitted six peremptory strikes and the defendant or defendants ten, and in
misdemeanor cases each side is permitted three peremptory strikes. See FED. R. CRI. P. 24(b).
Criminal defendants are provided more peremptory strikes in felony cases because a defendant's
interest in seating an unbiased jury outweighs the government's interest. Frank, supra note 57, at
2091. It has always struck this author as irrational that a defendant facing death or a misdemeanor
punishment have the same number of peremptory strikes as the government, but defendants facing a
felony charge are permitted more peremptory strikes than the government. Indeed, the history of
the number of peremptory strikes afforded each party in a criminal case is complex, largely
arbitrary, and mired in mystery. See generally Peremptory Challenges, supra note 20, at 819-22
(relating the history of peremptory challenges, including the number afforded each side in a
criminal case).
116. FED. R. CRI. P. 24(b).
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) advisory committee's note to 2002 amendment.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 955 F.2d 1116, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
whether to grant more peremptory strikes to criminal defendants lies solely within the discretion of
the trial judge (citing United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 1991))); United States v.
Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1406 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial judge has discretion whether and
when to grant additional peremptory strikes to parties). But see United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d
532, 541 (7th Cir. 2001) (opining in dicta that "a shift in the balance of peremptory challenges
favoring the prosecution over the defendant can raise due process concerns.").
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
121. See James R. Coltharp, Jr., Acting Without "Just Cause": An Analysis of the Ninth
Circuit's Decision in United States v. Symington, 89 KY. L.J. 227, 228-29 (2000) (citing FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(c)) (relating evolution of court using alternative jurors as substitutes and not dismissing
them at the start of deliberations).
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juror is deemed unable to serve.122 Alternate jurors may also be substituted for
123
regular jurors after the jurors have begun deliberations.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF JURY VOIR DIRE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Having reviewed the origin and purpose of jury voir dire, and examined the
limited relevant Constitutional and statutory provisions and rules on the subject,
it is now appropriate to turn to surveying how jury voir dire is practiced in
federal criminal trials. A natural consequence of the limited, broad, and optional
language of Rule 24(a) has unsurprisingly led to very diverse voir dire practices
in federal courts around the country.124 The practices vary federal district to
federal district, and in some cases judge to judge within districts, and the practice
has changed over time.125 One of the developments in jury voir dire is the use of
written jury questionnaires as a means of eliciting information from prospective
jurors in advance of jury selection to aid the court and attorneys in voir dire.2 6
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(1).
123. Rule 24 was amended in 1999 to permit courts to substitute alternate jurors for jurors
who were excused for cause after deliberations began. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) advisory
committee's note to 1999 amendment.
124. Jury selection practices vary greatly in federal courts in many other ways, not only with
respect to whether and to what extent lawyers are permitted to participate in jury voir dire. For
example, because no statute or rule establishes the procedure for parties to exercise peremptory
strikes, the manner in which they exercise them can be dramatically different. The method varies
dramatically in logistically how many jurors are initially questioned, whether the attorneys exercise
peremptory strikes in front of the jury, whether they are required to exercise all their peremptory
strikes, and whether they take turns exercising strikes. All of this is left to the whims of individual
judges and local practice. Although there is some benefit to leaving discretion to judges in the
operation of their courtrooms, it seems to this author that rules establishing a uniform practice for
the exercise of peremptory strikes would promote national consistency and ensure parties received
the full benefit of the peremptory strikes provided them by statute. Further, if the process was
subject to some study, it may be found that one method is preferable over another in the sense of
being less subject to abuse by attorneys, such as using peremptory strikes to remove prospective
jurors based on race, gender, or some other protective class.
125. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (recognizing that judges have broad
discretion during voir dire (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931))); Ashok
Chandran, Color in the "Black Box": Addressing Racism in Juror Deliberations, 5 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 28, 37 (2015) (acknowledging the Supreme Court's attitude toward voir dire has
changed dramatically over the twentieth century).
126. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1, 6 (2007).
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A. Participation of Attorneys in Jury Voir Dire
Federal judges historically have been hostile toward attorney participation in
jury voir dire.127 The 1924 Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
advocated that judges alone conduct jury voir dire.128 This became the trend
during the middle of the last century, with federal trial judges generally
depriving parties from direct participation in jury voir dire.129 A 1960 survey
showed a majority of federal judges barred attorneys from directly examining
prospective jurorS.130 By 1977, attorneys were only rarely allowed to directly
participate in questioning prospective jurors.131
A more recent survey by the Federal Judicial Center, however, showed a
shift toward greater attorney participation in voir dire.132 In 1994, a majority of
federal judges surveyed "allowed at least some direct attorney participation" in
jury voir dire.133  Another study completed about the same time, however,
suggested that a majority of federal judges exclusively conduct jury voir dire.134
The Federal Judicial Center has not conducted a survey on this issue in the last
127. See generally Recommendations of Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 10
A.B.A. J. 875, 875 (1924) (stating that the Judges recommended removing attorney participation in
voir dire).
128. Id. (recommending that "the judge alone" examine prospective jurors for the "dispatch of
business" and "[i]f counsel on either side desires that additional matter be inquired into, he shall
state the matter to the judge, and the judge, if the matter is proper, shall conduct the examination.").
129. See GORDON BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VoIR DIRE EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND
OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 5-10 (1977) [hereinafter VoIR DIRE
EXAMINATION] (noting that from 1957 to 1977, "judicial control of the voir dire examination has
increased.").
130. See Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, The Jury
System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960) [hereinafter Judicial Conference]
(summarizing the results of a survey showing that judges alone conducted jury voir dire in 51 of the
94 federal districts, a combination of judges and counsel conducted jury voir dire in 22 of the
federal districts, and in twelve districts, jury voir dire was conducted solely by counsel. In other
words, approximately 30% of judges allowed some attorney questioning).
131. See H.R. REP. No. 95-195, at 7 (1977) ("In most Federal courts the judge conducts voir
dire. Only rarely are counsel permitted to question prospective jurors directly.").
132. See Memorandum from John Shapard & Molly Johnson on Survey Concerning Voir Dire
to Advisory Committee on Civil Rules & Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 1 (Oct. 4 1994)
[hereinafter 1994 Memorandum] (stating that less than 30% of district judges allowed voir dire in
"typical" cases in 1977, whereas 59% reported attorney participation in 1994).
133. Id. (reporting that in a random survey of 150 active district court judges, "59% indicated
that they allowed at least some direct attorney participation in voir dire of civil trial juries, and 54%
so indicated with regard to criminal juries.") (noting a margin of error of 8%).
134. See KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: JURY
TRIAL § 4:7, at 184 n.8 (6th ed. 2006) (in survey of 450 federal judges, 67% indicated they alone
conduct examination of prospective jurors).
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twenty years, so it is hard to know whether the trend toward increased
participation by attorneys in jury voir dire continues.3 5
In practice, the type and manner of jury voir dire conducted by judges varies
considerably.136 Some judges conduct minimal voir dire and do not permit
lawyers to conduct any voir dire.137  Other judges conduct lengthy and
sometimes robust voir dire, 138 and will permit the lawyers to conduct voir dire as
well. Still, other judges adopt practices that fall somewhere between these
extremes.139 When judges do permit lawyers to conduct voir dire, they usually
place time limitations on the lawyers.140  This varied voir dire practice is
inconsistent with the goal of uniformity in federal court practice across the
-141
nation.
B. Use of Written Jury Questionnaires in Aid ofJury Voir Dire
It is now a common practice among district courts to have prospective jurors
fill out written questionnaires when their names are drawn for potential
service.142 The questionnaires seek basic, important information about
prospective jurors, such as age, occupation, education, prior jury service,
135. Telephone Interview with Matt Sarago, Fed. Jud. Ct. (Feb. 20, 2015) (notes retained by
author).
136. This is based on the author's own experience, having tried more than 60 federal criminal
cases before nineteen judges in six federal district courts, and upon experiences related to the author
by other federal prosecutors.
137. This was the author's experience when he tried a federal criminal case in the Northern
District of Florida in 2010.
138. One federal judge, for example, engages in a lengthy jury voir dire practice, which
involves a civics lesson complete with a PowerPoint presentation. See Kirk W. Schuler, In the
Vanguard of the American Jury: A Case Study of Jury Innovations in the Northern District oflowa,
28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 453, 469-72 (2008) (citing GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-
STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 27 (2007)).
139. It has been this author's experience in most federal criminal trials that judges perform a
relatively brief voir dire, eliciting basic information from prospective jurors, largely through close-
ended questions in response to which prospective jurors are to raise their hands if they have
affirmative answers. In most cases, the judges then permit the lawyers to conduct jury voir dire,
limited usually to approximately one-half hour. See, e.g., State v. Cornwell, 715 N.E.2d 1144, 1150
(1999) (limit on voir dire allotting each side one-half hour to question each prospective juror).
140. See Ann M. Roan, Reclaiming Voir Dire, THE CHAMPION, July 2013, at 23 (noting that
many courts impose rigid time limits on attorney-conducted voir dire).
141. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (2008)
("Ensuring the uniform interpretation of federal law has long been considered one of the federal
courts' primary objectives, and uniformity is regularly cited in some of the most intractable debates
about the structure and function of the federal court system.").
142. See United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that it is a "common
practice" to have potential jurors complete questionnaires prior to trial for use by the parties and the
court to conduct jury selection).
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criminal history, etc.143 The questionnaires are then provided to the trial judge
and the lawyers to be used for the purpose of jury selection. Written
questionnaires can be an efficient and effective way to get non-case-specific,
basic information about prospective jurorS.144
In addition to these standard questionnaires routinely issued by federal
courts, case-specific questionnaires may also be submitted to prospective jurors
145 146seeking much greater information. This is often done in complex cases
such as capital cases where juror views on the death penalty are critical in jury
selection47  or in cases where there has been substantial publicity about the
case.14 8  Courts have broad discretion, however, to refuse to issue such
questionnaires.4 9
There are some limitations and disadvantages to written jury questionnaires.
First, written questionnaires are not standard or uniform across federal district
courts.15o The information sought in the standard questionnaires vary
considerably in depth from court to court.'5 ' Second, prospective jurors may not
provide full and complete information in written questionnaires.152  Third,
prospective jurors may not understand a question in a written questionnaire
143. Attached as Appendix A is the standard jury questionnaire used in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
144. See Robert J. Hirsh et al., Attorney Voir Dire and Arizona's Jury Reform Package, 32
ARIZ. ATT'Y 24, 29 (1996) (suggesting that pretrial questionnaires may be the most efficient and
reliable method of obtaining information about prospective jurors).
145. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 371 (2010) (discussing case-specific
juror questionnaire used in complex security fraud case).
146. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing case-
specific juror questionnaire used in complex organized crime case).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 190 (4th Cir. 2013) (referencing case-
specific juror questionnaire used in capital case); United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 213-14 (2nd
Cir. 2008) (discussing case-specific questionnaire in capital case).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Kadir, 718 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (referencing case-
specific juror questionnaire used because of publicity issues); United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d
492, 507 (6th Cir. 2011) (referencing case-specific juror questionnaire used because of extensive
pretrial publicity).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 300 n.8 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to issue a written questionnaire to prospective jurors).
150. A sample juror questionnaire was attached to the 1994 Federal Judicial Center
Memorandum, but it was only referenced as an example. 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at
Exhibit B 2-6. There appears to be no attempt by the United States Court to develop a uniform
written jury questionnaire.
151. This is based on the author's experience trying cases in many different federal district
courts. In one federal district, the jury questionnaire consisted of two pages with the most basic
biographic information, such as residence, job, and education. In contrast, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa worked with a panel of practicing attorneys to develop a
fairly lengthy and informative questionnaire. (Attached as Appendix A).
152. It is the author's experience, for example, that it is not uncommon to find that jurors do
not fully disclose criminal history in response to questions in jury questionnaires. This is
discovered when the parties research criminal records of prospective jurors.
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because it is vague.153 By definition, there is no opportunity for follow up or ask
clarifying questions in a written questionnaire. Fourth, answers in questionnaires
may be vague, imprecise, or unintelligible. Again, there is no opportunity for the
question to be clarified. Fifth, the setting and circumstances surrounding the
completion of juror questionnaires do not necessarily ensure complete, accurate,
or thoughtful answers. Prospective jurors may rush through the questionnaire,
viewing the task as a hassle, and therefore not give careful thought to answers.
Further, when prospective jurors complete jury questionnaires at home, there is
none of the aura of importance and seriousness present in a federal courtroom
that serves to create a sense of responsibility to provide candid, contemplative
answers. Finally, answers to written questionnaires may not reflect the
prospective juror's own views. When prospective jurors fill out the
questionnaires at home, they may seek input from family members, others, or
receive such unsolicited input when completing the questionnaire.154
On the other hand, in some instances prospective jurors may actually
provide more complete or candid answers in jury questionnaires than in open
court. Jurors may feel less inhibited in sharing information in writing than orally
in front of strangers.15 5  This is particularly so with respect to controversial
topics, such as a prospective juror's views about race or capital punishment.156
Thus, the form of questioning by written questionnaire is likely to elicit
information that is different from that which would occur in response to oral jury
voir dire.
Regardless of the pros and cons of jury questionnaires, they cannot
adequately substitute for jury voir dire, as has been explored on occasion.5 7
Appellate courts have affirmed trial judges' removal of jurors for cause based
solely on their answers to jury questionnaires, even without the benefit of voir
153. See, e.g., Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting vague question
propounded in jury questionnaire); United States v. Basciano, No. 05-CR-60, 2011 WL 913197, at 3
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011) (rejecting proposed jury question because it was vague); Watts v. Maine,
No. 08-290-B-W, 2009 WL 249236, at 9 (D. Me. Feb. 2, 2009) (finding question in jury
questionnaire to be vague).
154. See Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving evidence that the
juror's wife filled out the juror questionnaire for her husband).
155. See Ream, supra note 42, at 26 (arguing "prospective jurors are more forthcoming in
answering private questionnaires than in a public forum."); Lisa Blue Baron & Robert B.
Hirschhorn, Top Five Voir Dire Strategies, TRIAL, 32, 32 (2014) (without citation to authority,
survey, or study, the authors opined that "most jurors feel more comfortable writing their answers
than publicly answer questions.").
156. It is not uncommon for the author to have reviewed juror questionnaires where
prospective jurors have written racist comments or expressed views showing the prospective juror is
prejudiced against some group, but when asked in open court by the trial judge whether the
defendant's race would affect any of the prospective jurors' ability to be fair and impartial, the same
prospective jurors have sat silently, hands fixed at their sides. Likewise, the author has tried capital
cases and found that, in some instances, prospective jurors' answers in jury questionnaires differed
dramatically regarding their views of capital punishment than did their answers in open court.
157. See Ream, supra note 42, at 26; Baron & Hirschhorn, supra note 155, at 32.
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dire to explore answers to written questionnaires. Though, when this occurs a
trial judge's decision is afforded no deference on appeal because the trial judge
did not make the decision based on a credibility assessment.159  More
importantly, removal of a few clearly biased prospective jurors based on answers
to written questionnaires does not eliminate the need for voir dire of the
remaining prospective jurors who may still harbor biases or other disqualifying
views, but, perhaps, were less honest or less expressive of their views in the
written questionnaires.
V. THE PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS OF JURY VOIR DIRE
To determine whether jury voir dire should be reformed, and in particular
whether the law should be changed to ensure attorneys have the ability to
conduct jury voir dire, it is appropriate to consider the perceived problems and
expressed criticisms of jury voir dire practice. This may best be accomplished
by considering each of the jury voir dire options set forth in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 24(a). The alternative forms of jury voir dire permitted
under Rule 24(a) are: (1) nobody conducts voir dire; (2) the judge conducts voir
dire, with or without input from the attorneys; or (3) the court conducts voir dire
and permits the attorneys to directly examine the prospective jurors. There are
problems with each method standing alone.
A. IfNobody Conducted Voir Dire
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) allows a trial judge to dispense
160 161
with voir dire entirely. It is unlikely, in practice, that any judge does So.
This is probably because the problems with conducting no jury voir dire are
obvious. Parties cannot intelligently challenge prospective jurors for cause, or
the judge intelligently determine whether to remove prospective jurors for cause,
if the parties and the judge are ignorant of information necessary to determine if
158. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the dismissal of a juror based on questionnaire answers); United States v. Paradies, 98
F.3d 1266, 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing the dismissal of a juror based on questionnaire
answers); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn and
superseded inpart by United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (1990).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing
de novo a district court's decision to remove jurors for cause based solely on answer to written
questionnaires).
160. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1) ("The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit
the attorneys for the parties to do so.").
161. The author has never tried a case, criminal or civil, state or federal, where the trial judge
did not conduct some type of jury voir dire. Nor could the author find any reported federal criminal
cases where it appears that a trial judge completely dispensed with jury voir dire. See also
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 129 (2003) (stating that all American jury
trials involve some jury voir dire questioning).
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a juror can be fair and impartial. Moreover, lawyers cannot exercise peremptory
challenges fairly and rationally if they know little or nothing about the
- - 162
prospective jurors.
One of the most compelling reasons that jury voir dire, at the very least jury
voir dire conducted by the trial judge, is critical to jury selection is how it
impacts the appropriate exercise of peremptory strikes.163 The less information
lawyers have to work with in exercising peremptory strikes, the more likely it is
that the lawyers will exercise those strikes relying on stereotypes and hunches.164
Left with little information, lawyers trying to exercise peremptory strikes are
more likely to make such decisions based on appearance or generalizations about
a prospective juror's employment, residence, age, or some other basic
information the lawyer does know or can visually perceive about the juror.165
Ignorance, in this instance ignorance of useful information about prospective
jurors, breeds prejudice.166 Worst yet, ignorance about prospective jurors invites
the exercise of peremptory strikes based on unconstitutionally biased grounds,
such as race or gender.167 Jury voir dire, therefore, should decrease the
162. Some commentators would reform the jury selection system by eliminating voir dire and
eliminating or severely limiting peremptory strikes. See, e.g., Marie D. Natoli, Au Revoir, Voir Dire
and Other Costly and Socioeconomically Unjust Judicial Practices, 47 NEw ENG. L. REV. 605,
617-22 (2013) (citations omitted) (arguing that voir dire wastes time and lawyers use jury
consultants to warp the process).
163. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1994) ("If conducted properly,
voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and
pejorative notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise. Voir dire
provides a means of discovering the actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties
may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.").
164. See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bold Men and People With Green Socks?
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1179,
1190-91 (2003) (citing Abbe Smith, "Nice Work if You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 524-28 (1998); Barbara Allen Babcock, Jury Service
and Community Representations, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 460, 463
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, "
27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975)) [hereinafter Wonderful Power] (noting studies which show that when
attorneys lack sufficient information about prospective jurors, they fall back on stereotypes as a
basis for exercising peremptory strikes).
165. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 168 (1989) (the author found
courts' presumption that prosecutors are motivated by racism in exercising peremptory strikes
insulting and "exhibited an apparent misunderstanding of the litigation process" whereby
prosecutors are compelled to exercise peremptory strikes on the basis of limited information).
166. See RAM RAMAKRISHNAN, MANY PATHS, ONE DESTINATION: LOVE, PEACE,
COMPASSION, TOLERANCE, AND UNDERSTANDING THROUGH WORLD RELIGIONS xxvi (2009)
("Ignorance breeds prejudice, hatred, fear, and misunderstanding."); PETER TREMAYNE, BADGER'S
MOON: A MYSTERY OF ANCIENT IRELAND 75 (2003) ("Ignorance breeds prejudice, prejudice
breeds fear, fear breeds hate.").
167. See JIE.B., 511 U.S. at 143 ("If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about
potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypes and pejorative notions about a particular gender
or race both unnecessary and unwise.").
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unconstitutional exercise of peremptory strikes by increasing the information
parties have upon which rationally to base peremptory strikes.
B. When Only the Judge Conducts Voir Dire
Rule 24(a) contemplates the possibility of the trial judge alone asking
questions of the jurors, at the court's discretion aided by input by the parties.168
Judge-only voir dire is, in fact, the practice in many federal district courts.169 As
will be seen, though, there are a myriad of reasons why judge-only jury voir dire
is inadequate to constitute effective jury selection.
Prospective jurors view judges differently than other humans. Sitting on
high, in flowing black robes, with all the trappings and authority of office, judges
can be intimidating to citizens, particularly those unfamiliar with the judicial
system.17 0 When, then, these authority figures ask prospective jurors questions,
the answers will be influenced by the setting and dramatically different positions
occupied by the questioner and the questioned.'7  The environment and
circumstances simply are not conducive to candid responses.172 Rather, it is
more likely that prospective jurors will provide answers they believe will please
or at least be acceptable to this priest-like figure. 173 It is a brave, or disturbing,
168. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(2) ("If the court examines the jurors, it must permit the
attorneys for the parties to: (A) ask further questions that the court considers proper; or (B) submit
further questions that the court may ask if it considers them proper.").
169. See supra notes 127-139.
170. See Unglesby, supra note 23, at 92 (stating that, in 2005, the American Bar Association
found that empirical research showed "jurors would be more candid responding to an attorney who
they see as more of a 'coequal' rather than the authoritarian figure represented by the judge.");
Brian McKeen & Phillip Toutant, The Case for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 90 MICH. B.J. 30,
31 (2011) ("Judges, as robe-cloaked authority figures, may inadvertently chill jurors' responses to
questions during voir dire.").
171. See, e.g., William H. Levit et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 916, 926 n.46 (1971) [hereinafter Empirical Study] (citing Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 526-27 (1965)) (summarizing results of
post-trial interviews in which jurors expressed views that their integrity was at issue when being
examined by a judge); Laura Cooper, Voir Dire in Federal Criminal Trials: Protecting the
Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 48 INDIANA L.J. 269, 276 (1973) (stating that "the
authority and imposing appearance of the judge may awe prospective jurors into giving what they
think is the appropriate response rather than the candid one."); Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus
Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 131, 143 (1987) (citing Empirical Study, supra, at 939) (reporting that prospective jurors
are more candid and less likely to give socially desirable answers to lawyers than they are to
judges).
172. See Empirical Study, supra note 171, at 926 n.46 (citing Broeder, supra note 171, at 526-
27).
173. See Hans & Jehle, supra note 164, at 1194 (citing Shari Seidman Diamond et al.,
Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77,
92-93 (1977)) (summarizing a study showing that, when questioned by judges, prospective jurors
are likely to give answers they perceive will please the judge).
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juror indeed who would candidly respond to a trial judge's question about race,
for example, with a racist answer.174  Thus, when judges ask questions, the
answers are often based on what prospective jurors think the judge wants to hear,
not based on what the prospective jurors really believe. Despite the
overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary, however, judges still believe
"jurors will be more candid in responding to the judge than to counsel."17 5
Further, with all due respect to trial judges everywhere, they are often not as
skilled as practicing trial lawyers in asking questions, despite what they may
think.176 Some federal district court judges were not trial lawyers before
ascending to the bench, and therefore have no practice in conducting voir dire at
all.' 7 7  Due to a lack of practice, other judges, though once practicing trial
lawyers, have lost the edge on the interrogation skills they once possessed. Jury
voir dire is part of trial advocacy, trial advocacy is a skill, and all skills must be
practiced regularly to be at their best. It takes skillful jury voir dire to uncover
latent biases held by prospective jurors reluctant to reveal them.7 8 The Federal
Rule of Evidence prohibition on leading questions is limited to direct
examination of a witness,17 so skillful lawyers can use any combination of
open-ended and leading questions necessary to tease relevant information out of
reticent prospective jurors.
174. See Bennett, supra note 58, at 160 ("As a district court judge for over fifteen years, I
cannot help but notice that jurors are all too likely to give me the answer that they think I want, and
they almost uniformly answer that they can 'be fair.' I find it remarkable when a juror has the self-
knowledge and courage to answer that he or she cannot be fair in a particular case, and even more
remarkable when the juror's explanation for that inability is based on a factor that neither I, nor the
parties, have raised.").
175. 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 6 (reflecting survey results that "[a] number" of
responding judges believed they elicited more candid responses from jurors than do attorneys).
176. As one might anticipate, judges don't necessarily share that view. See id. (reflecting that
a "number" of responding judges expressed the view that "judges simply do a better job of voir dire
questioning," in part because "counsel aren't very good at it."). Although jury voir dire skill level
certainly differs from attorney to attorney, on average practicing attorneys are more in practice in
examining people than are sitting judges. See McKeen & Toutant, supra note 170, at 31 (noting
that attorneys are better positioned to conduct voir dire questions "because of their knowledge of the
case, tendency to probe relevant bias-influencing factors, and ability to elicit honest responses.").
177. As an example, a review of just the first thirty-five Article III judges listed in JUSTICES
AND JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(2006), reveals one judge who was in private practice for one year, whose career otherwise
consisted of serving on the staff of a Senate committee, being a law clerk, and teaching as a
professor. Another judge was an associate at a law firm for four years, then was a professor before
becoming a trial judge. Still another was a trial attorney for only three years before serving in state
appointed offices and as a state court judge before becoming a federal trial judge. Finally, another
federal trial judge's entire experience consisted of being a juvenile referee, a municipal judge, and a
state appellate judge; nothing in the judge's biography suggests he ever tried a case.
178. See Cooper, supra note 171, at 274-75 ("A voir dire examination must be thorough and
probing to overcome a venireman's strong desire to conceal disqualifying personal information.").
179. See FED. R. EVID. 611(c) ("Leading questions should not be used on direct examination
except as necessary to develop a witness's testimony.").
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Another reason that judge-only jury voir dire is inadequate is that a trial
judge will not know the case at the bar anywhere near as well as the lawyers
trying the case.80 A skillful and effective jury voir dire is one tailored for the
case being tried.'8 ' It is important to ask prospective jurors questions not just
about basic background information about them, but also about their views
regarding specific matters that are at issue in the litigation.182 Using an arson
case again as an example, it would be important to know whether a prospective
juror has experienced a fire, or served as a firefighter, or works for an insurance
company, among other things. The trial lawyers are simply better informed, and
therefore better equipped, to conduct effective questioning of prospective
jurors.183
Finally, the American judicial system is premised on the belief that
adversarial process is the best method for arriving at the truth.184 The confidence
we have in the adversarial process should extend to jury selection. ss Just as the
process of having adverse parties question witnesses is most likely to draw out
180. See Wonderful Power, supra note 164, at 549 noting that judges' relative lack of
knowledge of the case of either party makes them less effective examiners); Cooper, supra note
171, at 275-76 ("Another advantage of counsel participation in voir dire is that, unlike the judge,
trial attorneys are familiar with facts of the case which may present important areas for inquiry.").
See also United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that "voir dire
examination in both civil and criminal cases has little meaning if it is not conducted by counsel for
the parties. A judge cannot have the same grasp of the facts, the complexities and nuances as the
trials attorneys entrusted with the preparation of the case.").
181. See Bennett, supra note 58, at 150, 160 ("At the beginning of the jury selection process,
judge-dominated voir dire, with little or no attorney involvement, prevents attorneys from using
informed strikes to eliminate biased jurors. For a variety of reasons, judges are in a weaker position
than lawyers to anticipate implicit biases in jurors and determine how those biases might affect the
case. Thus, permitting judges to dominate the initial jury selection causes more biased jurors to
remain on a case and exacerbates the role of implicit bias in jury trials." "Because lawyers almost
always know the case better than the trial judge, lawyers are in the best position to determine how
explicit and implicit biases among potential jurors might affect the outcome.").
182. See Unglesby, supra note 23, at 93 (arguing that a "court will rarely understand the
particular nuances of a case that require follow-up questions to certain answers.").
183. See id. (citing WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 188-94 (2004)) (arguing that "lawyers who know
their case are in the best position to recognize the problems" of bias).
184. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that the
adversarial process "helps us get at the truth.").
185. See Frank, supra note 57, at 2075 ("In an adversarial system, when both sides engage in
[the jury selection] process, they theoretically produce a balanced jury."). It is noteworthy,
however, that the vast majority of judges lack confidence in the adversarial system when it comes to
jury selection. See VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, supra note 129, at 19 (recording that in 1977, 84% of
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the truth,86 so too the process of having adverse parties engage in jury voir dire
is more likely to draw out the true facts and views of prospective jurors.1s?
C. When Attorneys Participate in Jury Voir Dire
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) leaves to trial judges unfettered
discretion of allowing, or disallowing, the parties to directly participate in
selecting their own jury. Many federal judges exercise their discretion to permit
parties to directly question prospective jurors. Direct involvement by attorneys
in jury voir dire is not without its own problems. Criticisms include assertions
that attorney-conducted jury voir dire consumes too much time and that
attorneys abuse the opportunity to question prospective jurors by trying to
improperly influence them.8 8 As will be seen, the time criticism is not
supported by the empirical evidence, and both time and abuse issues can be and
are adequately addressed by the exercise of judicial supervision over the process.
The principle reason justifying the exclusion of attorneys from jury voir dire
is the perception that it is necessary to save time.189 It is commonly believed that
if lawyers are permitted to participate in jury voir dire, jury selection will
become unreasonably long.190 The empirical data shows this concern to be
misplaced and overstated, at least as it is practiced in federal court. Jury voir
186. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) ("cross-examination [is] 'the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth."' (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940))).
187 See Cooper, supra note 171, at 275 ("It is likely that the judge, not having an adversarial
interest in the trial, will tend to ask general questions whose desired answer is evident, rather than
specific questions that might reveal information on which to base a challenge.") (citing Silverthome
v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 638 (9th Cir. 1968) (cert. denied); Smith v. United States, 262 F.2d
50,51 (4thCir. 1958))).
188. See 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 4 (noting that survey results of judges reveal
that questioning of prospective jurors "takes too much time."); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
705 (1991) (arguing that some attorneys attempt to influence prospective jurors, instead of
conducting proper questioning during jury voir dire).
189. See, e.g., 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 4 (50% of surveyed judges reported that
questioning of prospective jurors by attorneys "takes too much time."); Judicial Conference, supra
note 130, at 467 (identifying how voir dire examinations by the judge "results in great savings of
time."); Cooper, supra note 171, at 271 (citing Judicial Conference, supra note 130, at 467;
Empirical Study, supra note 171, at 955; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions,
Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REV. 1, 73 (1956); Comment, Voir Dire Examination-
Court or Counsel, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 234, 248 (1967)) ("Those who support court-conducted voir
dire are primarily concerned with saving time.").
190. United States District Court Judge William L. Dwyer opined that jury selection often
takes "days, weeks, or even months" and "[t]he chief cause is uncontrolled jury questioning by
lawyers-voir dire." WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY'S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 164 (2002). See also
Alschuler, supra note 165, at 157 ("In the United States, the process of selecting a jury is often
prolonged, sometimes consuming as much time as the trial.").
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dire does not take a significant amount of time, particularly in federal court.191
Further, studies have revealed that jury voir dire where attorneys are permitted to
directly examine prospective jurors does not take much more time than when
judges alone question the prospective jurors.192 In a study conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center, Judges wrongly perceived that questioning of
prospective jurors by attorneys would "more than double the time required for
voir dire," but the study found this was "at odds with" the results of the survey
"which indicate[d] very little difference in voir dire time regardless of whether
the judges allows much, little, or no counsel questioning of jurors."193
Moreover, the number of federal trials have decreased substantially over time,
suggesting that the concern about time management is less urgent today than
perhaps it has been in the past.194
If there is a concern that attorney participation in voir dire would cause
unreasonable delay in the trial, this problem is easily solved by court-imposed
time limits.195 Trial judges have wide discretion regarding jury voir dire, and
may impose time limits on the parties when attorneys conduct jury voir dire.196
In theory, time limits could be written into the rules,197 but trial judges are better
191. See, e.g., 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 2 (reflecting the average time spent
questioning prospective jurors was 31 minutes in civil cases and 40 minutes in criminal cases); NEIL
VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 89 (2007) (citing GERALD R.
WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 7 (1983)) (Nationally, the average time for
jury selection in civil cases is 3.1 hours in state court and 2.3 hours in federal court, and for criminal
felony cases the average is 3.8 hours in state court and 3.6 hours in federal court).
192. See, e.g., 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 2 ("Perhaps most intriguing, however, is
the absence of much relationship between total voir dire time and the judge's indication of his or her
standard practice regarding attorney participation in voir dire. . . ."); VIDMAR & HANS, supra note
191, at 89 (noting that whether attorneys in federal courts participate in voir dire does not change
the amount of time it took to select a jury).
193. 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 4.
194. See Unglesby, supra note 23, at 92 (exploring federal court statistics, which show that by
early 2000, 1% of civil cases and 5% of criminal proceeded to trial, a 67% decrease from 1962).
195. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, for example, the
practice is for each party to have a half-hour to conduct jury voir dire. The court may, of course,
extend that time limit in appropriate cases. The time limit is reflected in the court's standard trial
scheduling order entered in each case.
196. In practice, when judges permit attorneys to directly examine prospective jurors, they set
time limits, on average 25 minutes in criminal cases. See 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 5.
The author has tried many federal cases, both civil and criminal, and his experience is that courts
typically limit jury voir dire in the usual case to one-half hour. It has been the author's experience
that this is a reasonable time limit. Together with the court's jury voir dire, the jury is typically
selected in one morning, with evidence starting in the afternoon of the first day of trial. This hardly
imposes a significant time burden on the judicial system, particularly when weighed against the
importance of seating an impartial and unbiased jury in a federal criminal case.
197. Indeed, such amendments have been unsuccessfully proposed. See Barat S. McClain,
Turner's Acceptance ofLimited Voir Dire Renders Batson's Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 273, 301 (1989) (citing A Bill to Amend the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Respect o Examination of Prospective
Jurors: Hearing on S. 1532 Before the S. Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
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situated to impose reasonable time limits on a case by case basis, depending on
the complexity of the case at bar.198
Another criticism of lawyers directly participating in jury voir dire is that
they improperly attempt to try the case during voir dire.199 In other words, in the
guise of asking voir dire questions, lawyers attempt to argue the merits of the
200case during jury voir dire or instruct the prospective jurors about the law.
There are no known empirical studies regarding whether and how often this
actually occurs; the criticism could be as misplaced as the concern that attorney
participation in jury selection takes too much time. To the extent it occurs,
however, courts have the discretion to control this type of questioning.201 Courts
may prohibit attorneys from asking questions that incorporate any alleged facts
involved in the case or ask other questions the court finds improper.202 In
97th Cong. 1 (1981)) (noting that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure
permit attorneys for parties to examine prospective jurors were proposed multiple times in the
1980s).
198. For example, a similar argument could be made that time limits should be imposed for
opening statements and closing arguments because the danger exists that attorneys could waste
considerable time when addressing juries. There are no federal rules setting time limits on opening
statements or closing arguments, however, and none are necessary because trial courts have and
exercise the discretion to place reasonable time limits on attorneys when addressing the jury. See,
e.g., United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914, 937 (11th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that the period of
time allotted to attorneys for closing arguments is within the sound discretion of the trial judge
(quoting United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1581 (11th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Holt, 493
F. App'x 515, 521-22 (5th Cir. 2012) (although disagreeing with the district court's "severe limit"
on closing arguments, the court held that the limitation did not constitute plain error (citing United
States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Wright, 651 F.3d 764, 773 (7th
Cir. 2011) (noting that trial judges have substantial discretion to place time limits on "peripheral
issues" such as opening statements and closing arguments (quoting United States v. White, 472 F.3d
458, 462 (7th Cir. 2006))).
199. See, e.g., 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 4 (67% percent of federal judges
surveyed responded that questioning of prospective jurors by attorneys "[r]esults in counsel using
voir dire for inappropriate purposes (e.g., to argue their case, or simply to 'befriend' jurors.");
Hastie, supra note 188, at 705 (arguing that some attorneys attempt to influence prospective jurors,
instead of conducting proper questioning during jury voir dire).
200. See Cooper, supra note 171, at 271 (citing Broeder, supra note 171, at 522; Empirical
Study, supra note 171, at 942-44; Joshua Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on
the Decisional Process, 56 GEO. L.J. 839, 842 (1968); Vanderbilt, supra note 189, at 73))
("Lawyers have been criticized for using voir dire to influence the entire panel in order to obtain a
favorably inclined jury and for 'preinstrucing' jurors on the facts or law involved in the case.");
Broeder, supra note 171, at 522 ("Conservatively, about eighty per cent of the lawyers' voir dire
time was spent indoctrinating, only twenty per cent in sifting out the favorable from the unfavorable
veniremen.").
201. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) ("[T]he trial judge retains discretion as to
the form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the
venire individually or collectively.").
202. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991) (holding that a trial judge has broad
discretion to determine what questions are asked of jurors during voir dire); Woods v. Swarthout,
No. C-13-0309 EMC (PR), 2014 WL 988988, at 12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (affirming district
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practice, judges who permit attorneys to directly examine prospective jurors
203
exercise this discretion to control such questioning.
Finally, in some instances, lawyers may not be as effective as judges in
examining prospective jurors. Although jury voir dire is primarily designed to
elicit information about prospective jurors, it can also be a means to educate
jurors about, and inculcate in jurors, fundamental constitutional rights afforded
204criminal defendants. During jury voir dire, it should be a goal of the judge
and both attorneys to discover, and remove, jurors who are unable or unwilling
to afford criminal defendants the presumption of evidence and the right to
remain silent, and hold the government to its burden of proving the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Recognizing, however, that the most rigorous
and effective jury voir dire may still not uncover concealed or unconscious
beliefs regarding these basic principles, jury voir dire can be used to inform
jurors of those rights and duties, and to extract promises from prospective jurors
205to afford the accused of those rights and hold the government to its burden.
The hope, of course, is to guilt prospective jurors into suppressing their
inclinations and adopting the fundamental constitutional guarantees. Arguably,
this is best accomplished when performed by the judge, whose word carries
206more authority and whom jurors seek to please. As mentioned above, judges
207
are held in awe by average citizens. Is it more likely, then, that a juror will
feel morally bound to keep promises made to a judge than if the same promises
are extracted by an attorney for one of the parties?
VI. THE SOLUTION
The best jury selection practice would encompass juror questioning in all its
forms: written jury questionnaire, questions from the judge, and direct attorney
examination of prospective jurors. The use of all these methods is most likely to
elicit the greatest amount of information so that the court, and the parties, may
make decisions about whether to remove jurors for cause, or through peremptory
strikes, in the most intelligent and rational way possible. The use of all three
methods, with appropriate judicial oversight and reasonable time limits, can
court's ruling which barred the defendants from asking questions of prospective jurors during voir
dire based on the specific facts of the case at bar).
203. See 1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at 5 (noting that judges set parameters for
permissible voir dire and will admonish counsel when necessary).
204. Bennett, supra note 58, at 160 (reflecting that the author, a federal trial judge for fifteen
years, did not always resist the "temptation" of "pos[ing] questions with the intent of educating
jurors.").
205. See GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 62, § 3:19, at 97 (noting that trial judges "know
how to use the power of the office to educate the juror" that they are not to be biased or prejudiced).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 170-175.
207. See supra text accompanying note 170.
2015] 65
31
Williams: To Tell You the Truth, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(A) S
Published by Scholar Commons, 2015
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
exploit the benefits of each method while mitigating the problems each method
possesses when used in isolation.
First, written juror questionnaires should be used in every federal criminal
case.208 Jury questionnaires are of inestimable value to the judge and lawyers in
jury selection. Ideally, the United States Courts would formulate a standard
questionnaire that would be used in every federal district court across the
country, designed to elicit basic information that would be helpful in every
federal trial, criminal or civil, for the court and parties to select a fair and
209impartial jury. In appropriate cases, where the issues are complex or where
publicity is an issue, district courts should issue more comprehensive and case-
specific questionnaires. To be clear, although jury questionnaires are very
beneficial for courts and litigants in the exercise of for-cause challenges and
peremptory strikes, they are not adequate by themselves. There is no substitute
for oral jury voir dire.
Second, the trial judge should begin jury selection by examining the
prospective jurors in every federal criminal case. The judge's questions should
at least focus on the trial process, the constitutional rights of the accused, and
controversial issues such as race or publicity. The trial judge can also most
efficiently elicit basic information from prospective jurors, such as prior jury
service, whether any of the prospective jurors know the parties, witnesses, or
each other, familiarity with the facts of the case, and other basic information.
The trial judge can either ask appropriate follow up questions to affirmative
answers, or leave the follow up to the attorneys. Trial judges should generally
leave attorneys to ask questions that probe potential bias or prejudice against the
parties based on case-specific facts. Finally, judges should use the aura of office
to inculcate jurors with the importance of a criminal defendant's constitutional
and the government's burden ofproof.210
Finally, in stark contrast to what the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
currently provide, attorneys for the parties should be permitted to examine
prospective jurors in every federal criminal trial. Having made the case that
effective and fair jury selection is best accomplished when lawyers participate in
208. The ABA American Jury Project includes submitting written jury questionnaires among
its suggestions for creating a more uniform and effective system of selecting juries. See Am. Bar
Ass'n, American Jury Project: Principles for Juries and Jury Trials 13 (2005), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/juryprojectstandards/principles.authcheckdam.pdf
209. The Federal Judicial Center's sample jury questionnaire would serve the purpose. See
1994 Memorandum, supra note 132, at Exhibit B 2-6.
210. It might be most effective for the trial judge to conduct this type of inculcation after the
court has completed the rest of its voir dire and the attorneys have conducted their voir dire. If done
before, it could discourage prospective jurors from truthfully divulging beliefs inconsistent with
these core constitutional principles. Once the rest of the voir dire process is complete and any
motions to remove jurors for cause has passed, then this type of an address to the prospective jurors
will promote the goal of compelling prospective jurors to afford a criminal defendant with the
constitutional rights.
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jury voir dire, then it follows that in criminal cases where the consequences are
grave that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be amended to permit
lawyers to participate in jury voir dire in federal criminal cases. Courts may, and
should, supervise attomey-conducted voir dire to place reasonable time limits
and restrict the scope of examination to questions designed to elicit information
relevant to for-cause challenges and the exercise of peremptory strikes.
As it reads now, Rule 24(a)(1) provides that courts may, but are not required
to, permit attorneys for the parties to examine prospective jurors. Rule 24(a)(2)
goes on to provide that, if the court decides to examine prospective jurors, then it
may permit attorneys for the parties to ask follow up questions or submit
questions for the court to ask if it deems them proper. Both of these provisions
should be changed. The rule should reflect that both the court, and the attorneys
for the parties, are permitted to question prospective jurors. The rule should
further be amended to provide explicit discretion to the court to adopt time and
content limitations on attomey-conducted voir dire to prevent unreasonable
delay and promote efficient, effective, and fair jury selection.
Rule 24(a)(1) should be amended to read:
(a) Jury Voir Dire. The court should examine prospective
jurors regarding their qualifications and ability to serve as
jurors. The court must then permit attorney for the parties
to examine the prospective jurors. The court may impose
reasonable time limits on the parties' examinations of
prospective jurors, and may limit the questions to those the
court considers proper.211
VII. CONCLUSION
If the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury is to be afforded criminal
defendants, then jury voir dire should be reformed in a manner best designed to
elicit information that would allow judges to remove jurors for cause and for
parties to exercise peremptory strikes for permissible reasons. The presumption
that attomey-conducted voir dire causes unreasonable delay is unsupported by
211. A redlined version of the current language of Rule 24(a) more readily exposes the
proposed changes:
(1) -i-getnefal. Jury Voir Dire. The court may should examine prospective jurors
regarding their qualifications and ability to serve as jurors. er-may The court must
then permit the attorneys for the parties to de-se examine the prospective jurors.
(2) Cout Examination Ifthcurt exmnsth uos, it mulst p~eimit the attorneys
(A) Ask further question tat The court may impose reasonable time limits on the
parties' examination of prospective jurors, and may limit the questions to
those the court considers propert-er
(B) Submi that the cour May ask if it considers them pro(a).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
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empirical studies and judges' antagonism toward attorney-conducted voir dire is
misplaced. The time has come to recognize that a comprehensive approach to
voir dire-one combining the use of written jury questionnaires, and
examinations by judge and attorneys-is most likely to uncover information
important in attempting to remove biased prospective jurors. Because Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) does not guarantee attorneys the right of jury
voir dire, it should be amended to do so.
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APPENDIX A
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